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(1) Whether, in entering the order, the Court violated the 
Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th 
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution? 
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(2) Given that the order was not entered within the requirements of 
the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, j 
| APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee, | 
vs. j 
| Court of Appeal Case # 970501 
CAPRICE T. MARTIN, j 
j District Court 
Defendant/Appellant. j Case No. 931900803 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah R. Crim. Pr. 
26(2)(a) and Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1995), whereby the defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for 
anything other than a first degree or capital felony. Appellant was convicted of Robbery, a 
Second Degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-301, on May 9th, 1994. 
Then, Defendant was sentenced to one year to fifteen years in the State penitentiary, with such 
sentence being suspended and the Defendant being placed on probation. On June 30, 1997, 
the Defendant's probation was revoked and the suspended sentence was imposed. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
POINT I: Whether the Court's Findings of Facts as to Defendant's knowledge of 
his rights were clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the 
evidence? 
l 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A Trial Courts findings of fact in a criminal case 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State of Utah v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 
787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However, 
Deference to the trial court findings can only be extended when the trial court's factual 
findings adequately reveal the steps by which the ultimate conclusion is reached. State v. 
Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547, 549-51. (Utah App. 1994). 
POINT II: Whether the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's 
probation at June 27th hearing, given that, legally, no order was entered 
before Defendant's probation expired by the terms of the order entered 
January 6, 1995? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court had the authority to extend 
Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no 
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IcLat 1067. 
POINT III: If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's 
probation on July 6, 1996, then: 
(1) Whether the order was an invalid extension of Defendant's 
probation given that the Court did not enter the order extending 
Defendant's probation within the limits imposed by the 
legislature? 
2 
(2) Given that the extension order was not entered within the limits 
imposed by the legislature, whether Defendant's probation 
terminated before the entry of a valid order of extension? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court had the authority to extend 
Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no 
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. Id,, at 1067. 
POINT IV: If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's 
probation on July 6, 1996, and the order was entered within the limits 
imposed by the legislature and the due process, then: 
(1) Whether, in entering the order, the Court violated the 
Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th 
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution? 
(2) Given that the order was not entered within the requirements of 
the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether 
Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid 
order of extension? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court had the authority to extend 
Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no 
3 
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. Id. at 1067. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The full tests of the following determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are 
reproduced at Appendix A. 
A. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
C. Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
D. Utah Code Section 77-18-1. 
E. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
On May 8, 1997, Defendant CAPRICE MARTIN brought a Motion to Dismiss the 
case State of Utah v. Caprice Martin. Case no. 9319 00803 FS. (District Court File, pages 
187 - 207). The Court held an evidentiary hearing and Mr. MARTIN produced evidence 
which showed that the Court lost jurisdiction on July 6, 1996, because the Defendant's 
probation was not legally extended, and thus, expired. (Transcript, May 8, 1997). The Court 
ruled that Mr. MARTIN's probation was legally extended, and thus, the Court could consider 
the Order to Show Cause to revoke Defendant's probation and imposed the sentence on the 
underlying offense. (District Court File, pages 236 - 237). Subsequently, Defendant was 
convicted before Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, in case no. 9719 00320 FS, of Escape from the 
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custody of a probation officer, a third degree felony, and assault against a peace officer, a 
class A Misdemeanor, said crimes occurring on January 14, 1997. Judge Leslie Lewis found 
that the convictions violated the terms and condition of probation in the case State of Utah v. 
Caprice Martin. Case no. 9319 00803 FS, revoked probation, and imposed the sentence of one 
to fifteen year in the State penitentiary. (District Court file, pages 243, 244). 
B. Course of the Proceeding. 
On May 9, 1994, the District Court, the Hon. Frank G. Noel, presiding, entered 
judgment, conviction and sentence against the Defendant CAPRICE T. MARTIN. (District 
Court File, pages 57, 58). The JUDGMENT provided that "Defendant is granted a stay of the 
above prison sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this Court and under the 
supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the period of 2 
years, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation." (District Court File, pages 57, 58). 
On December 20, 1994, an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE was filed by Defendant's probation officer alleging that Mr. MARTIN violated the 
terms and conditions of his probation. (District Court File, pages 65, 66). Also, a 
Progress/Violation Report was filed by Adult Probation and Parole. (District Court File, 
pages 65 -67). On January 6, 1995, the Defendant admitted allegations 1, 3, & 4, of the 
Order to Show Cause filed on December 20th, and allegation #2 was dismissed. (District 
Court File, pages 72-73). The Court found that Mr. MARTIN violated the terms of his 
probation and Mr. MARTIN'S probation was revoked and reinstated for 18 months running 
from January 6, 1995. (District Court File, pages 72-73). 
On May 28, 1996, a "Progress/Violation Report" was filed with the Court. (District 
Court File, pages 80 - 83). The Progress/Violation Report is signed by Glade Anderson, 
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Probation Officer, and Patricia Dennis, Supervisor. (District Court File, pages 80 - 83) At 
the end of the Progress/Violation Report, the document has the words, "APPROVED AND 
ORDERED:". (District Court File, pages 80-83, and Exhibit 2) After the words 
"APPROVED AND ORDERED", Pat Jones, a Court Clerk, wrote the words 7s/ FGN". 
(District Court File, pages 80 - 83, Transcript May 8th Hearing, pages 20:5 - 22:21) 
However, there was a copy of the "Progress/Violation Report" signed, after the words 
"APPROVED AND ORDERED", by Judge Frank G. Noel, and that original was sent Adult 
Probation and Parole. (Transcript, May 8, 1997, Transcript May 8th Hearing, pages 20:5 -
23:16). 
Under the order of January 6, 1995, Mr. MARTIN'S Probation terminated on July 6, 
1996. (District Court File, page 72). 
On September 30, 1996, Probation Officer Sherry Morgan filed an Affidavit in support 
of Order to Show Cause and Order to Show Cause. (District Court File, pages 84, 85). On 
October 25, 1996, a hearing was held on the Affidavit. The affidavit alleged that Mr. Martin 
failed to pay regularly toward his fine, failed to complete substance abuse treatment, and 
committed the offense of Assault, a Class B misdemeanor, on July 10, 1996. (District Court 
File, page 84, 85). Mr. Martin admitted allegations 1 2, & 3, and allegation number 4 was 
dismissed. (Transcript, October 25, 1996 and District Court File, pages 91). Probation 
Officer Morgan argued that Mr. MARTIN'S probation should be re-instated, but the Court did 
not determine disposition until June 27, 1997. Transcript, October 25, 1996, District Court 
File, pages 91, Transcript of June 27, 1997.) 
On March 12, 1997, Mr. MARTIN, by and through his Counsel, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the case, State of Utah v. Caprice Martin. Case no. 9319 00803 FS. (District Court 
File, pages 187 - 207). Pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss counsel for Mr. MARTIN intended 
to call Pat Jones, the court clerk of Judge Frank Noel, and possibly, Judge Noel himself. 
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(District Court File, pages 174 - 182). Thus, by Stipulated Motion, the Hon. Frank Noel 
signed an Order recusing himself form the District Court case. (District Court File, pages 
208-209). 
C. Evidence established at Evidentiary Hearing on May 8th, 1997. 
On May 8, 1997, before the Hon. Leslie Lewis, the Court held an evidentiary hearing 
Mr. MARTIN produced evidence which showed that the Court lost jurisdiction on July 6, 
1996, because Mr. MARTIN'S probation was not legally extended, and thus, expired. 
(Transcript, May 8, 1997). The evidence was as follows: 
In March, 1996, Glade Anderson became the probation officer for CAPRICE 
MARTIN. (Transcript, May 8th Hearing, 6:4-9). Probation Officer Anderson called 
CAPRICE MARTIN and sent Mr. MARTIN a letter. (Transcript, May 8th Hearing, 6:4 - 15) 
In response to the letter, Mr. MARTIN contacted Anderson. (Transcript, May 8th Hearing, 
6:4 - 15). Officer Anderson first met Mr. MARTIN on May 21, 1996. (Transcript, May 
18th Hearing, 7:3-24). 
At the May 21st meeting, Probation Officer Anderson showed Mr. MARTIN the 
waiver form, (See District Court File, page 82), which was the third page of Exhibit 3. 
(Transcript, May 8th Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14). Probation Officer Anderson did not show 
Mr. MARTIN the Progress/Violation Report, or discuss the contents of the Progress/Violation 
Report which is found in the District Court File, at pages 82, 83. (Transcript, May 8th 
Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14, and May 8th hearing, Exhibit 2, pages 1,2)* 
1
 Exhibit 2 is the same as pages 80, 81, and 82 of the District 
Court file. The Discription of Evidence Card, page 223, shows 
that the Court received and admitted Exhibit 2, and ordered that 
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The Waiver Form states that "I Caprice Martin . . . do hereby voluntarily request that 
my personal appearance before the Third District Court be waived and that my probation 
supervision be extended; AND/OR that the conditions of my probation be amended as 
follows:" (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3). Then, 
the document continues in handwritten language that "Probation extended 12 months from July 
6, 1996, for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of substance abuse 
counseling." (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3). 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never made aware that he had the 
right to receive advice from an attorney. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:13 -18). 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to 
require the probation office to show probable cause before he could be held on a hearing for 
violation of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 23). Before signing the 
Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he was entitled to a neutral officer making 
a determination of whether probable cause existed that Mr. MARTIN violated his probation. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 14:4). Before signing the Waiver Form, Mr. 
MARTIN was never informed that Adult Probation and Parole had the burden of proof to 
show that he willfully violated his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:5 - 14:9). 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to 
speak out and present evidence in his own behalf at a probation revocation hearing. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:10 - 14) 
Probation Officer Anderson testified that, at the May 21st meeting, Mr. MARTIN was 
never shown an Order to Show Cause or Affidavit asserting that Mr. MARTIN violated the 
it be placed in the file. Exihibit 2 is the same as Exhibit 3 
except that Exhibit 2 is signed u/s/FGN" while Exhbit 3 has Judge 
Noel's signature and was sent to AP & P and never filed. 
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terms of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 7:25 - 8:11, 13:9 - 13). The only 
persons in attendance at the May 21st meeting were Glade Anderson and CAPRICE MARTIN. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 10:12-15). On May 21, 1996, the only probation condition 
that had not yet been met was the verification of payment of the fine and verification of 
substance abuse counseling. Everything else was done. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 
9:14-19). 
Mr. MARTIN'S previous probation officer had focused on the other requirements of 
his probation, such as the requirement of achieving a G.E.D., and attending a cognitive 
thinking course. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 9:14 - 12:20). Officer Anderson testified 
that a probation officer never gives one probationer too many things to do at one time. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 11:12 -12:20) A probation officer is trained to stagger the 
requirements of probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 11:12 -12:20). 
On May 21, 1996, Probation Officer Anderson was aware that Mr. MARTIN'S 
probation was scheduled to terminate in July, 1996. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 
18:1-4). 
On May 28, 1996, the "Progress/Violation Report" was filed. (District Court File, 80 
- 83, and Exhibit 3) The Progress/Violation Report was signed by Glade Anderson and 
Patricia Dennis, from Adult Probation and Parole. (District Court File, 80-83, Transcript 
of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18) Neither Glade Anderson nor Patricia Dennis are licensed 
to practice law. (Transcript of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18). The document filed in the 
District Court file on May 28, 1996, was signed by Pat Jones, using the letters, "/s/FGN". 
Transcript of May 8th hearing, 22:12 - 18) The letters "/s/FGN" were place next to the 
language "APPROVED AND ORDERED:" on the Progress/Violation Report, at the direction 
of Judge Noel. (District Court File, 80-83, Transcript of May 8th hearing, 20:16 - 24). 
Besides the Progress/Violation Report, no other evidence was considered by Judge Noel 
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before he directed his clerk, Pat Jones, to place the letters "/s/FGN" on the Progress/Violation 
Report. Further, Judge Noel did not make any findings of fact, whether oral or written, on 
record regarding the Progress/Violation Report filed on May 28, 1996. (Transcript of May 
8th hearing, 27:25-28:8). 
D. Course of Proceedings after the May 8th hearing. 
On May 20, 1997, the Court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(District Court File, page 227 - 234). Subsequently, Defendant was convicted before Judge 
Homer F. Wilkinson, in case no. 9719 00320 FS, of Escape from the custody of a probation 
officer, a third degree felony, and assault against a peace officer, a class A Misdemeanor, said 
crimes occurring on January 14, 1997. Judge Leslie Lewis found that the convictions violated 
the terms and conditions of probation in the case State of Utah v. Caprice Martin. Case no. 
9319 00803 FS, and revoked probation, and imposed the sentence of one to fifteen years in the 
State penitentiary. (District Court file, pages 243 - 248). The order imposing sentence was 
signed by Judge Lewis on June 30, 1997, and Mr. MARTIN appeals from the entry of that 
order. (District Court File, pages 243 - 252). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The findings of fact, that Defendant MARTIN knowingly and intelligently waived his 
rights to allow an extension of probation, are erroneous and against the clear weight of the 
evidence. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation at June 
27th hearing, given that, legally, no order was entered before Defendant's probation expired 
by the terms of the order entered January 6, 1995. 
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Further, the Progress/Violation Report signed by Judge Noel's clerk did not enter the 
order extending Defendant's probation within the limits of Utah Code Section 77-18-1. Given 
that the extension order was not entered within the requirements of Utah Code Section 77-18-
1, Defendant's probation terminated on July 6, 1996. Thus, all other actions taken by the 
Court after July 6, 1996, are null and void. 
Finally, the Progress/Violation Report signed by Judge Noel's clerk violated the 
Defendant MARTIN'S procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th and 14th 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Given that the extension order was not entered within 
the requirements of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Defendant's 
probation terminated on July 6, 1996. Thus, all other actions taken by the Court after July 6, 
1996, are null and void. 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should hold that Defendant MARTIN'S probation 
was not legally extended within the probation period, and the Court lost jurisdiction over the 
case on July 6, 1996. Thus, this Court should remand this case and order the District Court to 
vacate the order signed June 30th, 1997, such order revoking Defendant's probation and 
entering a sentence of one to fifteen years in the State Penitentiary, and this Court should 
order the District Court to dismiss the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Whether the Court's Findings of Facts as to Defendant's knowledge of 
his rights were clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A Trial Courts findings of fact in a criminal case 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State of Utah v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 
787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear 
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weight of the evidence. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However, 
deference to the trial court findings can only be extended when the trial court's factual findings 
adequately reveal the steps by which the ultimate conclusion is reached. State v. Genovesi. 
871 P.2d 547, 549-51. (Utah App. 1994). 
In the instant case, the Court entered its findings of fact on the record. (Transcript of 
May 8th Hearing, pages 60:4-67:1). The Court found, on the record, that the waiver in 
this case was voluntary and intelligently made. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, page 66:9 -
10). This finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Then, the Court entered a written findings of fact and conclusions of law. (District 
Court File, pages 227 - 234). The written finding of facts at paragraphs 9 and 10 are not 
supported by the evidence. 
Paragraph 9 of the written findings of fact states: 
"On May 21, 1996, Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause proceeding would be 
initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of Personal Appearance, knew that 
at an Order to Show Cause proceeding he would be entitled at all due process and 
access to counsel right available to criminal defendants, knew that he would have the 
right to admit or deny any allegations of such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he 
would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which the state would have to show, 
upon the evidence, to a preponderance standard, that a probation violation had 
occurred, and he knew that his probation could be revoked and his original prison 
sentence entered if a violation was found." (District Court File, pages 227 - 234). 
In fact, the evidence offered at the Evidentiary Hearing of May 8th, 1997, does not 
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support the Court making those factual findings or legal conclusions. The testimony of 
Probation Officer Glade Anderson was as follows: 
"Q: What occurred in that meeting? 
A: He [Caprice Martin] came into our office, I had previously talked to him on the 
phone about some substance abuse classes. He came in, we further talked about 
him. I had prepared a wavier of appearance before the court. We talked about 
that. I had discussed him getting involved in some substance abuse classes. To 
my recollection, I referred him to a counselor to undertake those classes, and at 
that time he signed the waiver. 
Q: Okay. You talked about a progress report. I'm handing you what's to be 
marked as Defense Exhibit 2. Would you identify Exhibit Number 2? 
A: This is the progress violation report sent to Judge Noel outlining the request for 
the extension of probation, and attached was the waiver of personal appearance. 
Q: Is that a true and accurate copy of the document that you showed probationer 
Caprice Martin on May 21st, 1996? 
A: As far as the waiver, yes, I believe it is. I did not show him a copy of the 
progress violation report. 
Q: So then it would be accurate to state that the only document that Caprice Martin 
saw was that waiver, which is the third page of Exhibit 2? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was Caprice Martin shown any other documents before he signed that waiver, 
which is the third page of Exhibit 2? 
A: I don't believe he was. 
THE COURT: Let me interject with a question, here. Did you read the 
probation violation report, the PVA, to him? 
THE WITNESS: No, Your honor, I did not. 
THE COURT: Did you discuss the contents of it with him? 
THE WITNESS: No, we did not. 
THE COURT: What did you represent he was waiving by signing the waiver 
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document? 
THE WITNESS: I represented that he was waiving his personal appearance before 
the court. I believe we talked about an order to show cause, that 
one would not be required to - -
THE COURT: On what? Did you represent to him what the order to show cause 
would have been? 
THE WITNESS: Failure to compete substance abuse classes. 
(Transcript May 8th Hearing, pages 7:3-8:24). 
Probation Officer Glade Anderson further testified that: 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never made aware that he had the 
right to receive advice from an attorney. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:13-18).* 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to 
require the probation office to show probable cause before he could be held on a hearing for 
violation of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 23). Before signing the 
Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he was entitled to a neutral officer making 
a determination of whether probable cause existed that Mr. MARTIN violated his probation. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 14:4). Before signing the Waiver Form, Mr. 
MARTIN was never informed that Adult Probation and Parole had the burden of proof to 
show that he willfully violated his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:5 - 14:9). 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to 
speak out and present evidence in his own behalf at a probation revocation hearing. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:10 - 14) 
Probation Officer Anderson testified that, at the May 21st meeting, Mr. MARTIN was 
never shown an Order to Show Cause or Affidavit asserting that Mr. MARTIN violated the 
terms of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 7:25 - 8:11, 13:9 - 13).. On May 
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21, 1996, the only probation condition that had not yet been met was the verification of 
payment of the fine and verification of substance abuse counseling. Everything else was done. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 9:14-19). 
Thus, the Court findings in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the written findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-
36 (Utah 1994). Further, the Court's findings on the record in the May 8th hearing and in the 
written findings that Defendant MARTIN'S waiver of was intelligent, knowing and voluntary 
are not supported by the clear weight of the evidence and are clearly erroneous. See State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
POINT II: Whether the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's 
probation on June 27, 1997 given that, legally, no order was entered 
before Defendant's probation expired by the terms of the order entered 
January 6, 1995? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court had the authority to extend 
Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no 
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IcLat 1067. 
The record shows, that by order of the Court, Mr. MARTIN'S probation was revoked 
and reinstated for 18 months running from January 6, 1995. (District Court File, pages 72-
73). The Court must commence proceedings to extend, modify, or revoke probation and 
must serve notice of those proceedings on Defendant before his probation expires, in order to 
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extend, modify, or revoke probation. Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990). 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that: 
"(a) An Application to the Court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other 
than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court 
otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it 
is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by affidavit or 
evidence." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, the Court did not entertain a "motion" to extend, modify, or 
revoked Defendant's probation prior to the expiration of Defendant's probation on July 6, 
1996. And thus, the Court did not, legally, enter an "order" to extend, modify, or revoke 
Defendant's probation prior to the expiration of Defendant's probation. 
On May 28, 1996, the "Progress/Violation Report" was filed. (District Court File, 80 
- 83, and Exhibit 3) The Progress/Violation Report was signed by Glade Anderson and 
Patricia Dennis, from Adult Probation and Parole. (District Court File, 80-83, Transcript 
of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18) Neither Glade Anderson nor Patricia Dennis are licensed 
to practice law. (Transcript of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18). 
This Court has held that the preparation of Motions and Orders constitutes the practice 
of law. See Board of Commissioners. Utah State Bar v. Peterson. 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 
1997). In this case, the Progress/Violation Report was prepared and signed by probation 
officers, neither licensed to practice law. However, probation officers are statutorily required 
to prepare these reports under Utah Code § 77-18-l(10)(b), which states that: 
"The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation 
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will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding finds, restitution, and other amounts 
outstanding." 
These reports are not motions or orders for the purpose of extending, modifying or 
revoking probation. See Utah Code § 77-18-l(10)(b). Thus, the most appropriate legal 
conclusion with regard to the Progress/Violation Report filed in the District Court file on May 
28, 1996, is that it is not, legally, an order extending probation but simply a "10(b)" report at 
the close of probation. 
Further reason to conclude that the Progress/Violation Report is a "10(b)" report and 
not an order is that an "order" must be entered pursuant to a "motion". See Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(a). Further, Rule 12(c ) requires that if there are any factual 
issues involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on fact on the record. 
See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(c). In the instant case, there are no findings 
of fact entered on the record. 
Finally, Utah Code § 77-18-l(10)(a)(iii) gives the Prosecutor, the victim and the Court 
the right to make motions to revoke probation. The form of the motion is identified as an 
"Order to Show Cause". See Utah Code Section § 77-18-l(10)(a)(iii). But, Utah Code 
Section § 77-18-1 does not contemplate probation officer's making "motion" in the form of 
Progress/Violation Reports. Instead, pursuant to Utah Code Section § 77-18-l(10)(b), 
probation officers are to notify prosecutors, who in turn, can file an Order to Show Cause. 
See Utah Code Section § 77-18-l(10)(b) and 12(b). 
Since the Court did not enter an order extending Defendant's probation before 
Defendant's probation expired by the terms of the order entered on January 6, 1995, and the 
proceedings to extend Defendant's probation were not commenced before the Court was 
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without jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation and impose the sentence on June 27th, 
1997. 
An order entered placing a Defendant on probation expires by its own terms unless the 
Court legally, properly, and constitutionally, enters a subsequent order which revokes, 
modifies or extends. See Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah 1990). Otherwise, 
"Defendant's would be left in a perpetual state of limbo". State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462, 464 
(Utah 1988). 
In "order for a court to retain its authority over a probationer who is not actively 
evading supervision, the probationer must be served with the order to show cause with the 
period of probation." Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 794 (Utah 1990). A probationer is 
entitled to prior notice of the extension proceedings and a hearing before the court has the 
authority to extend probation. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995). If no 
such notice is given and a hearing held, the court lacks authority to extend probation. IcL 
In the instant case, the probation revocation proceedings are never properly 
commenced before the trial court lacks authority to extend Defendant's probation. Thus, the 
Court attempt to revoke probation and impose Defendant's sentence pursuant to the June 27, 
1997 hearing, is null and void. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah App. 
1995). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order signed by the Court on 
June 30, 1997, which revoked probation and imposed the one to fifteen year sentence, and on 
remand, order the district court to dismiss the case. 
POINT III: If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's 
probation on July 6, 1996, then: 
(1) Whether the order was an invalid extension of Defendant's 
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probation given that the Court did not enter the order extending 
Defendant's probation within the limits imposed by the 
legislature? 
(2) Given that the extension order was not entered within the limits 
imposed by the legislature, whether Defendant's probation 
terminated before the entry of a valid order of extension? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court had the authority to extend 
Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no 
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IcL at 1067. 
1. Order extending Defendant's probation was not entered within the 
limits imposed by the legislature. 
The power to revoke probation must be exercised within legislatively established limits. 
State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988). The trial Court's power to grant, modify, or 
revoke probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, 
the court's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature. Smith v. 
Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court lacks 
jurisdiction to revoke probation when it acts outside the scope of its legislative authority. 2 
2
 Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 791 (1990){ci t ing State v. Green, 
757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988); State v. Cowdell. 626 P.2d 487, 
488 (Utah 1981). 
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A. The Court was not presented the "probation extension" question, as 
required by Utah Code Section 77-18-1. and thus, did not enter a valid 
order. 
The controlling statute is Utah Code § 77-18-l(12)(b), which requires that: 
"(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on 
the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order 
to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended." (Emphasis added.) 
Under the statute, after the Court, in considering an affidavit, determines there is 
probable cause to warrant an extension of probation, then the Court sets a hearing. See Utah 
Code § 77-18-l(12)(c)(I). "The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing." Utah 
Code § 77-18-l(12)(c)(I). 
The statute further requires the order to show cause inform the defendant of his rights, 
including: (1) the right "to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to appoint counsel for 
him if he is indigent"; and (2) the right "to present evidence". Utah Code § 77-18-
l(12)(c)(iii) and (iv). 
The statute requires the Defendant, at the hearing before the Court, "admit or deny the 
allegations of the affidavit." Utah Code § 77-18-l(12)(d)(I). If the Defendant's denies the 
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allegations, then the prosecutor has the burden of proof and must present evidence. Utah 
Code § 77-18-1(12)(d)(ii). In a probation revocation, modification, or extension hearing, the 
Court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was willful. State 
v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994). A finding of willfulness merely requires a 
finding that the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his 
probation. IcL 
The statute gives the Defendant the right to cross examine witnesses against him and to 
"call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence". Utah Code § 
77-18-l(12)(d)(iii). 
As the record demonstrates, the above requirements were not met in this case. No 
affidavit was filed, nor did the Court make a determination the probable cause existed to 
believe that Mr. MARTIN violated the terms of his probation. (District Court File, pages 80 -
83,). Instead, a "Progress/Violation Report" was filed with the Court. (District Court File, 
pages 80 - 83). At the end of the Progress/Violation Report the document has the words, 
"APPROVED AND ORDERED:". (District Court File, pages 80 - 83, and Exhibit 2) After 
the words "APPROVED AND ORDERED", Pat Jones, a Court Clerk, wrote the words 7s/ 
FGN". Besides the Progress/Violation Report, no other evidence was considered by Judge 
Noel before he directed his clerk, Pat Jones, to place the letters "/s/FGN" on the 
Progress/Violation Report. Further, Judge Noel did not make any findings of fact, whether 
oral or written, on record regarding the Progress/Violation Report filed on May 28, 1996. 
(Transcript of May 8th hearing, 27:25 - 28:8). 
R, The Court was not presented with a valid wavier, as required 
by Utah Code Section 77-18-1. and thus, did not enter a valid order. 
2 1 
Attached to the Progress/Violation Report (District Court File, Page 82) was a 
"WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COURT." 
Utah Code § 77-18-l(12)(a) further provides that: 
"(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing 
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in Court that the probationer 
has violated the conditions of probation." (Emphasis Added,) 
Thus, this Court must determine what is required to comply with the statute to extend 
by waiver. In interpreting the meaning of "extended except upon waiver", this Court is to 
give primary consideration in statutory construction "to give effect to the legislature's intent. 
To discover that intent, this court looks first to the plain language of the statute. Only when 
the Statute is ambiguous will this Court seek guidance from the legislative history and policy 
considerations." State v. Winward. 907 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah App. 1995). 
This Court considered what was required to extend probation by waiver in State v. 
Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995). In Rawlings. the Court considered whether 
extension proceedings were conducted in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code § 77-
18-1 given that the Defendant was not given proper notice of the hearing. IdLat 1067. 
This Court held that a probationer in the State of Utah is accorded a measure of due 
process at a probation extension proceeding and is thus entitled to the available protections.3 
3
 State v. Rawlinqs. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995) {c i t i ng 
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987), and 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. 
442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979). In support of its holding the Court 
of Appeals noted that Utah Code Section 77-18-1(10) (c) created an 
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Id. In Rawlings. the Court noted that in Smith v. Cook, the Supreme Court stated that 
because the probationer was not given notice of the revocation proceedings before the 
probation period expired, the Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to 
revoke the probationer's probation. IcL at 1068. In Rawlings. the Court analogized that 
"while Smith involved statutory prerequisites to commencement of a probation revocation 
proceeding, the same analysis is applicable to commencement of probation extension 
proceedings." ML 
Thus, a probationer is entitled to proper notice of the extension proceedings and a 
hearing before the court has the authority to extend probation. IcL at 1069. "If no such 
notice is given and a hearing held, the court lacks the authority to extend the probation period 
because the trial court's discretion to extend probation 'must be exercised within the limits 
imposed by the legislature.'" Id. 
Further, a "Defendant may waive his or her constitutional right to due process. 
However, 'under the due process clause, [a defendant is] entitled to have [adequate notice] 
imparted to him [or her]; that he [or she] might make an intelligent and informed decision as 
to whether to waive his [or her] constitutional right to a . . . hearing." State v. Rawlings 893 
P.2d at 1070, quoting Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't. 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). 
Thus, in order for defendant to have effectively waived his due process right to proper notice 
and a hearing on the extension issues, the waiver must be knowing. IcL 
In the instant case, Defendant MARTIN did not receive proper notice of the extension 
expectation on behalf of the probationer of notice of the 
extension proceedings and a hearing, and that it was that 
statutory expectation, 10(c), to which due process protection 
attach. The legislature has amended Utah Code Section 77-18-
1(10) and deleted 10(c). However, the expectation of liberty 
interest is still created by Utah Code Section 77-18-1(12)(b), 
and thus, the State v. Rawlings analysis still holds valid. 
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proceedings, did not receive a hearing, and did not enter a knowing and intelligent waiver in 
front of a neutral detached decision maker. Thus, the waiver was not intelligent and knowing. 
At the May 21st meeting, Probation Officer Anderson showed Mr. MARTIN the 
waiver form, (See District Court File, page 82), which was the third page of Exhibit 3. 
(Transcript, May 8th Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14). Probation Officer Anderson did not show 
Mr. MARTIN the Progress/Violation Report, or discuss the contents of the Progress/Violation 
Report which is found in the District Court File, at pages 82, 83. (Transcript, May 8th 
Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14, and May 8th hearing, Exhibit 2, pages 1,2) 
The Waiver Form states that "I Caprice Martin . . . do hereby voluntarily request that 
my personal appearance before the Third District Court be waived and that my probation 
supervision be extended; AND/OR that the conditions of my probation be amended as 
follows:" (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3). Then, 
the document continues in handwritten language that "Probation extended 12 months from July 
6, 1996, for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of substance abuse 
counseling." (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3). 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never made aware that he had the 
right to receive advice from an attorney. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:13 -18). 
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to 
require the probation office to show probable cause before he could be held on a hearing for 
violation of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 23). Before signing the 
Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he was entitled to a neutral officer making 
a determination of whether probable cause existed that Mr. MARTIN violated his probation. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 14:4). Before signing the Waiver Form, Mr. 
MARTIN was never informed that Adult Probation and Parole had the burden of proof to 
show that he willfully violated his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:5 - 14:9). 
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Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to 
speak out and present evidence in his own behalf at a probation revocation hearing. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:10 - 14). 
Probation Officer Anderson testified that, at the May 21st meeting, Mr. MARTIN was 
never shown an Order to Show Cause or Affidavit asserting that Mr. MARTIN violated the 
terms of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 7:25 - 8:11, 13:9 - 13). The only 
persons in attendance at the May 21st meeting were Glade Anderson and CAPRICE MARTIN. 
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 10:12-15). On May 21, 1996, the only probation condition 
that had not yet been met was the verification of payment of the fine and verification of 
substance abuse counseling. Everything else was done. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 
9:14-19). 
Given the facts stated above, Defendant MARTIN did not enter a knowing and 
intelligent waiver as is required and contemplated by Utah Code § 77-18-1. 
2. Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid order 
extending probation. 
In the instant case, the probation revocation proceedings are never properly 
commenced before the trial court lacks authority to extend Defendant's probation. Thus, the 
Court attempt to revoke probation and impose Defendant's sentence pursuant to the June 27, 
1997 hearing, is null and void. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah App. 
1995). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order signed by the Court on 
June 30, 1997, which revoked probation and imposed the one to fifteen year sentence, and, on 
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remand, order the district court to dismiss the case. 
POINT IV: If an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's probation 
on July 6, 1996, and the order was entered within the limits imposed by 
the legislature and the due process requirement of the Utah Constitution, 
then: 
(1) Whether, in entering the order, the Court violated the 
Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th 
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution? 
(2) Given that the order was not entered within the requirements of 
the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether 
Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid 
order of extension? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court had the authority to extend 
Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no 
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IdLat 1067. 
"The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty 
or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due process [the U.S. Supreme 
Court has] inquired into the nature of the individual's claimed interest. Greenhotz v. Inmates 
of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex. 442 U.S. 2, 7, 99 S.Ct., 2100, 2103 (1979). 
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"To determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, [the Court] must 
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Board of Regents v. Roth. 
408 U.S. 564, 570-571, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-2706 (1972). This has meant that to obtain a 
protectable right "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He 
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to it." IcL at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. 
A. Defendant MARTIN'S Liberty Interest which is entitled to Due Process 
Protections. 
The U.S. Supreme Court examined the "nature" of the "liberty interest" involved in 
parole revocations in the case, Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). 
The Court notes that "the essence of parole is release from prison before the completion of 
sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the 
sentence. IcL at 477, 92 S.Ct. at 2598. To accomplish the purpose of parole, those who are 
allowed to leave prison early are subjected to specified conditions for the duration of their 
terms. IcL at 478, 92 S.Ct. at 2598. Thus, the nature of the liberty interest in a parole 
revocation is that a "[Revocation deprives an individual, not of absolute liberty to which every 
citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of 
special parole restrictions." IcL at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600. In Gagnonv. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 
778 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was no difference in the "liberty interest" 
for purposes of revoking parole or revoking probation. IcL at 781, 93 S.Ct. at 1759. 
In the instant case, the liberty interest is "absolute liberty" as opposed to the 
"conditional liberty" of parole and probation. On July 6, 1996, Defendant MARTIN'S 
probation was set to expire. At that time, Defendant MARTIN would no longer have 
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"conditional liberty", that is liberty "properly dependant on observance of special parole 
restrictions."4 Defendant MARTIN would have "absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled." Id Thus, part, but not all, of the nature of the liberty interest taken from 
Defendant MARTIN by the probation extension is that, without the extension, Defendant 
MARTIN would have thrown off the burdens of "conditional liberty" in favor of "absolute 
liberty". This Court has held that concerning "probation extensions" as outlined in Utah Code 
Section 77-18-1, Defendant's had a liberty interest that was entitled to due process 
protections. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995). 
Further, by statute, Defendant MARTIN was given other rights before his probation 
could be extended. These rights include: (1) the right to have the prosecutor file of an 
affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of 
probation; (2) the right to have the Court determine whether probable cause exists to believe 
that extension of probation is justified; (3) if probable cause is determined, the right to be 
served with a copy of the affidavit and an order to show; (4) the right to a hearing, not less 
than five days after being served with the Order to Show Cause, in which the Order to Show 
Cause is considered; (5) the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have the 
Court appoint counsel for the Defendant if he is indigent; (6) the right to present evidence at 
the hearing; (7) the right to have the prosecutor meet his burden of proof with evidence 
4
 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 260. The U.S 
Supreme Court noted that these "special parole conditions" were 
"typically" restrictions like forbidding parolees to use liquor 
or to have associations or correspondence with certain categories 
of undesirable persons. Parolees must seek permission from 
their parole officers before changing employment, changing living 
quarters, acquiring or operating a motor vehicle, traveling 
outside the community, or incurring indebtedness. Additionally, 
parolees must regularly report to the parole officer. Id. at 
478, 92 S.Ct. 2598. 
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establishing that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the violation of probation was willful; 
and (8) the right to cross examine witnesses against him and to call witnesses, appear and 
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. See Utah Code § 77-18-1(12) and. State v. 
Peterson. 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994). The above-listed rights, established by 
statute, create an expectation and it is this statutory expectation to which due process 
protections attach. See Board of Pardons v. Allen. 482 U.S. 369, 381, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2422 
(1987). 
Thus, in the instant case, Defendant's MARTIN'S liberty interest which is entitled to 
Due Process protections, is both, the right to be free of the restrictions of probation and the 
rights listed above, number one through eight. Before that liberty interest could be taken from 
Defendant MARTIN, Defendant MARTIN was entitled to Due Process protections.5 
IL The procedures Martin is entitled to before losing the above-described 
liberty interest. 
In determining what procedures are necessary to safeguard Defendant MARTIN'S 
liberty interest, the U.S. Supreme Court has set out three factors which must be considered in 
this case. Those factors were enunciated in Matthews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 
5
 In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), this 
Court held that Utah Code Section 77-18-1(10) (c) granted 
Defendants on probation the right to a hearing with proper notice 
before probation could be extended for good cause shown. Since 
the Rawlings decision, the legislature has stricken Utah Code 
Section 10( c) from 77-18-1. However, this does not change the 
Rawlings analysis because Utah Code Section 77-18-1(12), with a 
great deal of particularity, grants probationer ua hearing and 
proper notice" and requires "good cause shown" before probations 
can be extended. 
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893(1976), and they are: 
"[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
[2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, 
[3] the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 
In Gagnon, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a very similar situation to the instant case, had 
to determine what were the appropriate procedures to safeguard a probationer's liberty interest 
in continuing on probation without revocation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 
1756 (1973). In Gagnon. the Court noted that: 
"Revocation . . .is, if anything, commonly treated as a failure of supervision. While 
presumably it would be inappropriate for a field agent never to revoke, the whole thrust of the 
probation-parole movement is to keep men in the community, working with adjustment 
problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort when treatment has failed or is about 
to fail." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. at 1761.6 
Justice Powell, for the unanimous Supreme Court, further writes that "[e]ven though 
the [probation] officer is not by [his] recommendation [to revoke probation] converted into a 
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counselor to the probationer or parolee is then 
6
 quoting Remington, Newman, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein. Criminal 
Justice Administration. Materials and Cases, 910 (1969) . 
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surely compromised. When the [probation] officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's 
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter's own view, due process requires that 
the difference be resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the probationer or parolee 
and the State have interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion -
the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the 
State to make certain that is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at 
rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community. IcL 
In this case, the central question is whether a Defendant's probation should be extended 
beyond the term previously determined by the Court to be an adequate period of time to 
rehabilitate the Defendant. 
The probationer has an interest in being able to successfully complete probation, be 
done with the requirements and expenses of rehabilitative classes and constrains on movement 
and associations, and return to the normal life of "absolute liberty". Society has an interest in 
ceasing the costs, and the administrative and judicial burdens in supervising another 
probationer. When a probation officer determines that probation should be extended, his 
view point is in conflict with that of the probationer, and possibly, society's interest in ceasing 
the burden of administration. 
Thus, given the similar concerns and interests as outlined in Gagnon. the procedures 
for the extension of probation should be the same as the procedures for revocation of probation 
as outlined in Gagnon. 
In Gagnon. the U.S. Supreme Court required that a neutral detached decision maker 
preside over two hearings. Gagnon 411 U.S. at 785, 93 S.Ct. 1760-1. One hearing to 
determine whether probable cause exists to determine that the Probationer violated the terms of 
his probation. And the Second hearing to determine whether a probationer has in fact acted in 
violation of one or more conditions of his probation, and then, whether the probationer's 
31 
sentence should be imposed or whether he should be returned to probation. IcL_ 
Further, the probationer was entitled to (a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
probation; (b) disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him; ( c) the opportunity to be 
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause 
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional 
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 
statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation. 
Id at 786, 93S.Ct. 1761-62.7 
2. Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid order of 
extension. 
A. The Court's non-compliance with the requirements of the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.. 
As the record demonstrates, the Gagnon procedural requirements were not met in this 
case. The record farther demonstrates the Trial Court in extending Defendant MARTIN'S 
7
 As outlined in Utah Code § 77-18-1(12), the procedures required 
for extending probation are the same as the procedures required 
in Gagnon to revoke probations. See Gagnon. 411 U.S. at 785-6, 
93 S.Ct. at 1760-2 and Utah Code § 77-18-1(12). The procedures 
outlined in Utah Code § 77-18-1(12) are also the same procedures 
required by Gagnon. This makes sense since most of the conflicts 
between the probationer and the probation officer are the same in 
both revocation proceedings and extension proceedings. Further, 
many of the concerns that both the probationer has, and society 
has, are very similar in both extensions and revocations. 
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probation, did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 
5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 
No affidavit was filed. Also, the Court did not determine that probable cause existed 
to believe that Mr. MARTIN violated the terms of his probation. (District Court File, pages 
80 - 83, ). Instead, a "Progress/Violation Report" was filed with the Court. (District Court 
File, pages 80 - 83). At the end of the Progress/Violation Report the document has the words, 
"APPROVED AND ORDERED:". (District Court File, pages 80 - 83, and Exhibit 2) After 
the words "APPROVED AND ORDERED", Pat Jones, a Court Clerk, wrote the words 7s/ 
FGN". Besides the Progress/Violation Report, no other evidence was considered by Judge 
Noel before he directed his clerk, Pat Jones, to place the letters 7s/FGN" on the 
Progress/Violation Report. Further, Judge Noel did not make any findings of fact, whether 
oral or written, on record regarding the Progress/Violation Report filed on May 28, 1996. 
(Transcript of May 8th hearing, 27:25 - 28:8). 
R, Defendant's Martin's ineffective waiver of his Due Process 
Rights. 
Further, the Defendant MARTIN did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Due 
Process rights under the U.S. Constitution. 
Under the Due Process clause, a person is entitled to have the essential information 
imparted to him so that he can make an intelligent and informed decision as to whether to 
waive his constitutional right. See Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 
602 (1980)(interpreting the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.) 
Defendant MARTIN did not receive proper notice of the extension proceedings, did not 
receive the essential information to make an informed decision whether to waive his rights, did 
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not receive a hearing, and did not receive a neutral decision maker determining whether the 
waiver was knowing and intelligent at the time it was made. 
Gagnon's procedures require: (1) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; 
(2) disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him; (3) the presence of a neutral and 
detached hearing body or decision maker during the waiver of one's Due Process rights; (4) a 
full disclosure of Defendant's rights that he is waiving; (4) a written statement by the hearing 
body or decision maker as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for extending probation. 
SeeGagnon411 U.S. at 785-6, 93 S.Ct. 1760-2. 
The facts of this case demonstrate that Defendant MARTIN was not given his Due 
Process rights during the waiver of his Due Process Rights, and thus, the waiver was 
ineffective. 
C. Since the Trial Court did not comply with the procedural requirements 
of the U.S. Constitution for extending probations, this Court should 
vacate the sentence imposed at the June 27th hearing. 
In the instant case, the probation revocation proceedings are never properly 
commenced before the trial court lacks authority to extend Defendant's probation. Thus, the 
Court attempt to revoke probation and impose Defendant's sentence pursuant to the June 27, 
1997 hearing, is null and void. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah App. 
1995). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order signed by the Court on 
June 30, 1997, which revoked probation and imposed the one to fifteen year sentence, and on 
remand, order the district court to dismiss the case. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, this Court of Appeals should determine that Defendant 
MARTIN'S probation was not legally and constitutionally extended. Thus, by operation of the 
order of January 6, 1995, Defendant's MARTIN'S probation expired on July 6, 1996. Thus, 
the Court was without jurisdiction to conduct any further proceedings after July 6, 1996. Any 
and all revocations, extensions, and modifications, to Defendant MARTIN'S probation after 
July 6, 1996, are null and void. Thus, this Court should remand this case to the District 
Court, with an order requiring the District Court to vacate its order signed on June 30, 1997, 
and to enter and order of dismissal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues raised are significant. 
Dated this day of June, 1998 
Gregory M^^Konstantino 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was, this 2 ? day of June, 1998, mailed first class, 
postage-prepaid to: 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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Appendix A. 
A. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
C. Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
D. Utah Code Section 77-18-1. 
E. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12. 
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AMENDMENT V—GRAND JURY INDICTMENT FOR CAPITAL 
CRIMES; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION; 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW; JUST COMPENSATION FOR 
PROPERTY 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Proposal and Ratification were ratified on December 15, 1791. 
The first ten amendments to the Con- For the states which ratified these 
stitution were proposed to the Legisla- amendments, and the dates of rat-
tures of the several states by the First ification, see Historical Notes under 
Congress on September 25, 1789, and Amendment I. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
WESTLAW supplements U.S.C.A. electronically and is useful for additional 
research. Enter a citation in INSTA-CITE for display of parallel citations 
and case history. Enter a constitution, statute or rule citation in a case law 
database for cases of interest. 
Example query for INSTA-CITE: 790 F.2d 978 
Example query for United States Constitution: (first +6 amendment) +s 
religion 
Example query for statute: "42 U.S.C.*" +4 1983 
Also, see the WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this 
volume. 
A m e n d m e n t V . Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; * * 
7 
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AMENDMENT XIV—CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMU-
NITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOR-
TIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION 
OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Materials for the Due Process Clause of Section 1 are set out in 
this volume and the following volume. See preceding volume 
for materials pertaining to the Citizenship and Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses of that section and the volume containing 
the end of the Constitution for materials pertaining to the 
Equal Protection Clause of that section and Sections 2 to 5. 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States, according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of 
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representa-
tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or 
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort 
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds 
of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pen-
sions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
£ 
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lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for 
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obli-
gations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Proposal and Ratification. 
This amendment was proposed to the 
legislatures of the several States by the 
Thirty-ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866. 
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and 
transmitted to the Department of State a 
concurrent resolution, declaring that 
"the legislatures of the States of Connect-
icut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West 
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Mis-
souri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, 
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Ala-
bama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, 
being three-fourths and more of the sev-
eral States of the Union, have ratified 
the fourteenth article of amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, 
duly proposed by two-thirds of each 
House of the Thirty-ninth Congress: 
Therefore, Resolved, That said four-
teenth article is hereby declared to be a 
part of the Constitution of the United 
States, and it shall be duly promulgated 
as such by the Secretary of State." The 
Secretary of State accordingly issued a 
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, de-
claring that the proposed fourteenth 
amendment had been ratified by the leg-
islatures of thirty of the thirty-six States. 
The amendment was ratified by the State 
Legislatures on the following dates: 
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hamp-
shire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Ore-
gon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30, 
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York, 
Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867; 
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia, 
Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; 
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan. 
19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867; 
Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan. 
25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867; 
Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, 
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20, 
1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, 
Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868; 
Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina, 
July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868; 
South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama, 
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868. 
Subsequent to the proclamation the fol-
lowing States ratified this amendment: 
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan. 
17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870; Dela-
ware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland* Apr. 4, 
1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Ken-
tucky, Mar. 18, 1976. 
The Fourteenth Amendment originally 
was rejected by Delaware, Georgia, Loui-
siana, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas and Virginia. However, the State 
Legislatures of the aforesaid States sub-
sequently ratified the amendment on the 
dates set forth in the preceding para-
graph. Kentucky and Maryland rejected 
this amendment on Jan. 10, 1867 and 
Mar. 23, 1867, respectively. 
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and 
Oregon "withdrew" their consent to the 
ratification of this amendment on Mar. 
24, 1868, Jan. 15, 1868, and Oct. 15, 
186S, respectively. 
The State of New Jersey expressed 




Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=> 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compilers Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=» 82; 
Weapons <$=> 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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PART 3 
DEFENDANTS PLEADING NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF 
INSANITY 
77-16a-301. Mental examination of defendant. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. 
The privilege against self-incrimination does 
not protect defendants pleading guilty by rea-
son of insanity from examination under this 
section. However, the prosecution may use in-
formation from the examination only to rebut 
defendants' insanity claims but not to other-
wise establish guilt. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 
359 (Utah 1995). 
CHAPTER 17 
THE TRIAL 
77-17-1. Doubt as to degree — Conviction only on lowest. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When should jury's deliberation 
proceed from charged offense to lesser-included 
offense, 26 A.L.R.5th 603. 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice 
struct ion to jury. 
— In-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Sufficiency of corroboration of con-
fession for purpose of establishing corpus de-








Suspension of sentence — Pleas 
held in abeyance — Probation 
— Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Stan-
dards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Res-
titution — Termination, revo-
cation, modification, or exten-
sion — Hearings — Electronic 
monitoring. 
Disposition of fines. 
Liability of rescued person for 
costs of emergency response. 






during incarceration — Pen-
alty. 
Special condition of probation — 
Penalty. 
Petition — Expungement of 
records of arrest, investiga-
tion, and detention — Eligi-
bility conditions — No filing 
fee. 
Petition — Expungement of 
conviction — Certificate of eli-
gibility — Notice — Written 
evaluation — Objections — 
Hearing. 
Grounds for denial of certificate 
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(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant: 
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in community service restitution programs, includ-
ing the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or i 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines, 
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probationmay be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
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(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warran t by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
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(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); | 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
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(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(hi) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch . 20, § 1; 1985, ch. 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch . 134, § 2; 
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch . 206, § 6; 1992, ch. 
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch . 220, § 3; 
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch . 198, § 1;1994, 
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch. 
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3; 
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1995, substi-
tuted "Subsections 76-3-201(4) and (5)" for 
"Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4)" in Subsection 
(8)(i) and replaced "Chapter 1" with "Chapter 2" 
in Subsection (15). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, added references to "interest in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in 
Subsections (5)(c), (8)(i), (9)(a), UOHaXii), and 
(13), deleted a reference to Subsection 76-3-
201(3) in Subsection (8)(i), corrected a reference 
in Subsection (15), and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 184, effective 
May 1, 1995, deleted a requirement of a "rec-
ommendation from the Department of Correc-
tions regarding the payment of restitution by 
the defendant" in Subsection (5)(b)(ii); rewrote 
Subsection (6), making significant stylistic 
changes, decreasing the time tha t the presen-
tence investigation must be available before 
trial, which had been ten days, and adding the 
possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccu-
racies in the report; and added "and disburse-
ment" after "collection" in Subsection (9)(a). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, substituted "the recommended 
amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary 
damages," inserted "as defined in Subsection 
76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered" 
in Subsection (5)(a) and rewrote Subsection (9). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring" at the end of Subsec-
tion (8)(f), added Subsections (16) and (17), and 
corrected a statutory reference in Subsection 
(15). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 352, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (6), substituted "protected" for "pri-
vate" and "Chapter (2)" for "Chapter (1)" in the 
first sentence of Subsection (15), added Subsec-
tion (15He), and made related stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, substituted "protected" for "confidential" 
in Subsection (5)(d). 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
subdivided Subsection (8), made related desig-
nation changes, and added Subsection (8Kb). 
Compiler's Notes . — Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6 
proposed amending Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12 
and proposed adding a new Sec. 28 to that 
article. These proposals were approved by the 
voters, the changes to take effect on January 1, 
1995. Laws 1994, ch. 198, which amended this 
section to add the requirement of a victim 
impact statement, provides in § 16 that the 
Legislature intends the act to serve as the 
implementing legislation of those constitu-
tional amendments. 
Coordinat ion c lause . — Laws 1995, ch. 
184, § 5 directs that the amendments in that 
act to Subsection (6)(a) of this section shall 
supersede the amendments to the sme subsec-
tion in L. 1995, ch. 352. 
Laws 1995, ch. 301, § 6 provides that the 
amendments in that act to Subsections (5)(b)(ii) 
and (9)(a) supersede the amendments to the 
same subsections by ch. 184. 
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der the clearly erroneous standard; (2) review-
ing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal 
conclusions under the correction of error stan-
dard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's deter-
mination as to the type and amount of sanction 
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1992); Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The determination of whether conduct vio-
lates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis. 
Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
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Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
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Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L. 
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impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789. 
Comment Note — General principles regard-
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 
107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A.L.R. Fed. 13. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for infliction of emotional distress, 98 
A.L.R. Fed. 442. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Procedural requirements for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading «=» 287 to 304. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
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ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. I£ on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Weaver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
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(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff m an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as tnay be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R.C.P. 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria. 








—Standard of review. 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause in contract. 




Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
General and special appearances. 




Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
Summary judgment. 




—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
—Defect of parties. 
—Defective service of process. 
—Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
—"Failure to pay consideration. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Waiver. 
Cited. 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
When urging the trial court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima 
facie showing that the trial court has personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in 
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Ander-
son v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of 
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the 
pleadings and if the court considers them the 
other party must have the privilege of offering 
answering affidavits as upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v. 
Wffley, 1 \5tah 2h 254, 2B5 P.2a 422 (1953). 
Rights of opposing party. 
On review of a motion on the pleadings 
treated as a motion for summary judgment un-
der Subdivision (c), the party against whom 
the judgment has been granted is entitled to 
have all the facts presented, and all the infer-
ences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a 
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas 
Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958). 
Motion for more definite statement 
—Bill of particulars. 
A motion for a more definite statement, and 
not discovery procedures, is the appropriate 
means of obtaining the information formerly 
